that this aspect of ISO 9001:2000 Quality
Management System alone is enough to generate vast quality improvements in an organisation, purely through the domino effect caused
by genuine management commitment.
Operations people must realise that they
are responsible for quality—good or bad.
Quality-assurance/quality-control personnel are only responsible for reporting on the
state of quality, not for generating quality.
Product Realisation
The product realisation process is none
other than the core business process of manufacturing its product(s) or service(s). It is
self-evident that the best practise dictates
that this process should be properly planned
and developed to meet the requirements
of the product and of the customer. This
statement is further supported by Oakland
who found in his research that “identifying key-business processes”5 was one of the
best practises found among award-winning
companies. In demining, all processes in the
minefield are described and guided by standard operating procedures. However, the

stage of the process. It must be measured to
ensure that problems do not occur further
down the process. Oakland calls these internal customer relationships “quality chains,”5
and deems them vital in being able to meet
customer requirements.
Slater refers to measurement activities
as “the feedback loop”6 and further states
that without it, any system that seeks to address process control will fail. People need
to know how well they are achieving in order to progress. An organisation needs to
know the same in order for it to survive and
indeed prosper.
Oakland states that “a good quality management system will not function without
adequate audits and reviews.”5 A further advantage of audits is that they automatically
review processes and systems and are therefore useful for continual improvement.
The Standard requires organisations to
continually improve their processes through
a range of activities from reviewing nonconformities to reviewing corrective action. This
should be taken further in that organisations
should identify potential nonconformities

The Standard is even more useful for demining organisations in developing countries, as it can be a framework to
direct the organisation’s activities without having to purchase management expertise from developed countries.
minefield is only the last stage of the productrealisation process. The process stages before
that are very seldom described and audited.
In Integrated Process Management: A
Quality Model, Rodger Slater makes the
argument that entropy is a “universal force
which relentlessly presses all activity in the
direction of disorder.6 He contends further
that if discipline (measurement and control)
is not applied to key variables, they will
move to a state of chaos, even if they are not
problematic at the moment.
The Standard encapsulates the essence
of those variables in the production/service
process and seeks to impose the discipline
on them that is required to prevent these aspects from drifting into chaos.
Measurement, Analysis and
Improvement
Customer satisfaction not only relates to
the end user or external customer, it is also
applicable for internal customers, i.e., those
various people who develop the product
through the different stages of the process.
The product must fulfil certain requirements before it can be passed on to the next

Oakland5 contends that any organisation,
in essence, competes based on its reputation
for quality, reliability and price. Of the three,
quality is the most important. It is extremely
difficult to change a reputation from bad to
good, but very easy to go from good to bad.
The Standard provides transparent proof
to customers that an organisation is serious
about its business and takes the customers’
requirements seriously. In a donor-driven environment, transparency and effectiveness of
organisations are the basis on which donors
choose to get involved. Organisations wishing to obtain sustainable, long-term donors
will find that compliance with the Standard
will provide donors with confidence and willingness to engage in lasting partnerships.
The ISO 9001:2000 System is fully
compatible with and supported by international best practise. Any demining organisation that seeks to improve its standards and
achieve world-class recognition should seriously consider taking a strategic step forward
and adopting a quality-management system
based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard.
See Endnotes, Page
This article is published posthumously. Charles Loxton passed away in Kabul,
Afghanistan, in February 2006. The United
Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan is proud to
pay a tribute to Mr. Loxton in approving the
publication of this article, written during his
last assignment. Charles Loxton is remembered
for his dedication, hard work and joie de vivre.

and their causes in order to take preventive action. Oakland supports this view and
expands it to include a focus on prevention
rather than cure. Quality is about prevention—you cannot “inspect” quality into a
product. It has to happen before the inspection process.
Conclusion
The ISO 9001:2000 Quality Management
System requirements are an extremely useful
set of tools that cover the full spectrum of
management best practise as evidenced currently. The Standard is even more useful for
demining organisations in developing countries, as it can be a framework to direct the
organisation’s activities without having to
purchase management expertise from developed countries.
The Standard is a clear way to guide such
organisations to world-class status. There
is, however, a prerequisite to all these statements, and that is management commitment—if the top management team is not
going to be totally committed and accept responsibility for quality improvement, efforts
will be short-lived.
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Charles Loxton was born in South
Africa in 1960 and served in the South
African Army for more than 15 years.
Building on his strong military and
managerial background as Lieutenant
Colonel, after serving in the Army, he
started a new career in mine action.
Between 1999 and 2004 Mr. Loxton
worked for commercial demining
companies in Kosovo and Iraq before
joining UNMACA and the Mine Action
Programme for Afghanistan in 2004 as
Chief of Quality Management. He was
certified ISO 9001:2000 in 2001.
Mr. Kerei Ruru
Chief of Staff
United Nations Mine Action Centre for
Afghanistan
P.O. Box 520
Kabul / Afghanistan
E-mail: kruru@unmaca.org

Needs Assessment in Lao PDR
This article describes the needs-assessment process and findings for mine-risk education in Lao PDR.
Specific issues that arise are identifying those who are at risk, why they are at risk, and what can be
done about it.
by Jo Durham [ Mines Advisory Group ]

M

ine-risk education is an integral component of humanitarian mine action and, as
with other HMA components, should be a
planned intervention. A needs assessment—the process
of systematically collecting and analysing information
in order to identify who is at risk, why, and what can be
done about it—is an essential precursor to programme
planning and implementation. A good needs analysis
can help programme managers develop appropriate, targeted and effective interventions that address the needs
of the target populations. It is a crucial step in framing
an appropriate response to risk reduction.
Recognising the importance of a needs-assessment
in preparation for its new five-year strategy for the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic and based on an earlier Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining evaluation, UNICEF commissioned Mines
Advisory Group to undertake an MRE needs assessment
in five provinces in the Lao PDR.
The assessment identified a number of subgroups
that are at risk and helped bring into focus the myriad of contributing factors that influence behaviour. It
highlighted the differences in the ways the mine-action
“experts” and ”laypeople” analyse risk, make decisions,
and structure and solve problems in order to determine
an appropriate response. The findings suggest that in a
country such as the Lao PDR, where communities have
lived with unexploded ordnance infestation for over 25
years, more traditional mine-risk education may not be
what is required. What may be needed alongside traditional message-based interventions is a more holistic
and pragmatic risk-minimisation approach, which may
also require a collective paradigm shift in the way different stakeholders view UXO risk. Such methodology
would help bridge the current gap between experts’ and
laypeople’s opinions and result in more effective MRE.
Alongside this risk-minimisation approach, a more complete, integrated style of UXO action and development
will help address some of the underlying vulnerabilities
of at-risk populations. The assessment also pointed to
possible new directions for reaching women and children including integrating MRE into a broader lifeskills approach and parenting guides.
Background to the Assessment
Lao PDR has the distinction of being, per capita, the
most heavily bombed nation in the world.1 As a result
of intense ground battles and extensive bombing during
the Indochina War,2 especially during the years 1964–

Hidden threat: almost all people living in contaminated areas are potentially at risk of
exposure to live ordnance.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF MINES ADVISORY GROUP/SEAN SUTTON

11.1 | winter 2006 | journal of mine action | notes from the field | 77

1973, there is widespread contamination of UXO, which
continues to act as a barrier to socioeconomic development and causes death and injury to adults and children.
These injuries can result in long-term medical and psychological after effects as well as a huge financial burden
to affected individuals, families, their communities and
health services.
The government of Lao PDR, with assistance
from the United Nations Development Programme
and UNICEF, established the Lao PDR Trust Fund
for UXO in 1995 to finance a national programme
of clearance and education. A National Survey on
the Socio-economic Impact of UXO was conducted 3
and reported UXO contamination in 25 percent of all
Laotian villages. The United Nations Development
Assistance Framework for Lao PDR,4 as well as other
government and donor documents, identify UXO and
the threat it continues to pose to both livelihood security and personal safety as cross-cutting issues in
tackling poverty.
As with most other mine-action programmes, the
Lao MRE programme aims to promote safety in UXOcontaminated communities and has been primarily
underpinned by psychological theories of behaviour
change, such as the Health Belief Model.5 More specifically, UNICEF has supported MRE for children in
several at-risk communities in 12 of the most heavily
contaminated provinces. In preparation for its next
five-year strategy, UNICEF commissioned MAG to
undertake a risk assessment to ascertain who is currently at risk and why, as well as what can be done to
mitigate the risk.
Methodology
The assessment took an eclectic approach to the risk
assessment combining ecological approaches to health
promotion and injury-prevention and risk-management
approaches to environmental health. The study was also
informed by the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) Mine Risk Education Best Practice Guidebook
2, Data Collection and Needs Assessment for MRE 6
as well as the other IMAS for MRE Best Practice
Guidebooks7 and the UNICEF technical note Children
Participating in Research Monitoring and Evaluation
– Ethics and Your Responsibilities as a Manager.8
The assessment consisted of four main components:
a literature review; development, testing and administration of a quantitative Knowledge, Attitude and Practice
questionnaire; a qualitative assessment; and data analysis. An analysis of the available accident data was also
used to inform the assessment, which was conducted by
a MAG research team.
The KAP questionnaire was administered in five
UXO-contaminated provinces. Multi-stage cluster
sampling, probability proportional to size to determine
the sampling size and random sampling to identify
the sampling frame were utilized. The MAG research
team analysed the KAP questionnaire using a statistical
analysis software package, the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS), and provided broad contextual
information on a level of community UXO awareness,
attitudes, behaviours, assessment of risk associated with
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certain behaviours, and how and where people gained knowledge about UXO.
The results of the KAP were used to develop qualitative survey tools then
administered in two provinces. Using content analysis, the qualitative phase of
the research enabled a better understanding of the individual circumstances,
motivations and contributing factors which lead to voluntary or deliberate and
unintentional exposure to live ordnance. It also allowed for a more detailed understanding of the range of contributing socioeconomic, psychological, cultural,
political and legal factors that contribute to risk behaviours and exposure to live
ordnance. Qualitative data was gathered from UXO operators—technical staff
and programme managers using semi-structured and unstructured interviews to
gain an “expert” perspective.
Findings
The assessment found overall a high level of UXO awareness and understanding among both adults and children. For example, 82 percent of the adult respondents indicated that no UXO is safe and provided a range of correct responses
regarding common events that cause UXO to detonate—of the children surveyed,
99.6 percent considered UXO to be dangerous, with most of them reporting being
afraid of UXO.
Despite these known risks however, many people, including women and children, reported continuing to interact with live or potentially live ordnance on an
almost daily basis. Respondents rationally defended this apparent inconsistency,
even though their view was often at odds with “expert”9 views.
The assessment also found the general categories often used to characterize
at-risk populations, that is, the uninformed, the unaware, the reckless and the intentional, were less relevant to the context of Lao PDR. Instead, the study distinguished between intentional exposure (i.e. voluntary) to live ordnance—where
actors aware of the risk purposefully expose themselves to live ordnance—and
unintentional exposure (involuntary). Voluntary exposure may include for example, moving an item of UXO to another location or tampering with ordnance
for economic gain. Voluntary exposure included groups identified as high risk,
for example:
• Adult scrap-metal collectors
• Adults who move UXO out of farming land
• Scrap-metal dealers
• Adults who deliberately dismantle UXO
• Children who collect scrap metal
• Children who play or tamper with UXO
• Adults and children who work on agricultural land
• Out-of-school youth and young children
Unintentional exposure. Unintentional exposure to UXO injury is when a
person’s exposure to live ordnance is unplanned and may include exposure due to
inattention or lack of knowledge. While some of the prevention activities may be
the same, intentionality is an important variable and particularly relevant in Lao
PDR where UXO injury due to intentional exposure to live ordnance (for example
through the deliberate tampering of ordnance for the scrap-metal trade) is known
to be increasing.10
Involuntary exposure, such as exposure to sub-surface UXO while farming, is
generally feared due to the lack of control people have over the situation. People
have reported voluntarily exposing themselves to UXO—for example, removing
items from farming land—in order to avoid possible unintentional exposure later.
Contributing factors to involuntary exposure include the inability of clearance
agencies to respond to the needs of farmers and a lack of alternative agricultural
land. The following quote expresses a view shared by many and helps to illustrate
the farmers’ plight as well as highlighting the higher level of fear that surrounds
involuntary exposure: “No clearance team comes and helps us, so even though
it is not safe to move, when we find UXO this farming season we need to move
them, otherwise the following year when we farm again we don’t know where
they are.”
Intentional exposure. The assessment identified a number of perceptual, cognitive, pragmatic and economic market factors that informed respondents’ rational
defence of voluntary risk-taking behaviour. Respondents reported weighing ben-

efits and costs of UXO risk activities compared with other household risks. A key household risk, for example, is basic food insecurity,
which is often a motivating force in the decision to engage with, or at
least potentially engage with, UXO.
In trying to meet basic needs such as food security, individuals
and households also consider the costs and benefits of alternative income-generating options, sometimes preferring activities that may
expose them to UXO, such as scrap-metal collection. Where other
options had more perceived advantages than scrap-metal collection,
however, people reportedly abandoned scrap-metal collection for al-

an insufficient UXO clearance response contribute to people deciding
to voluntarily take risk: “I found more than 10 BLUs7 in my new farming land. Each time I moved them into one place and kept farming as
my family land is very small so I need to keep farming in that area.”
Predisposing factors that contribute to high-risk behaviour include level of contamination of farming land, belief that some UXO
are relatively safe to move, perceptions of safe behaviours and the
desire to investigate metal-detector signals. Enabling factors include
ease of picking up and moving UXO items, availability of metal
detectors and inability of clearance agencies to respond in a timely

Fifty-two percent of children surveyed reported collecting scrap metal.

ternative sources of income. Thus, while contributing factors of voluntary exposure to UXO were often rooted in poverty, it was rarely
perceived by communities or individuals as the only option. More
commonly intentional UXO risk-taking was found to be based on
a rational decision-making process involving weighing the potential
costs and benefits of a range of available options.
The most common ways in which people voluntarily expose themselves to UXO risk is through collecting or dealing in scrap metal,
moving UXO from farmland and dismantling UXO. The following
quote from one of the female respondents illustrates how contamination levels combined with the need to uphold basic food security and

manner to reports of UXO on farming land, UXO removal being
sometimes perceived as the removal of a legitimate cash crop, and a
certain level of social and parental acceptance of UXO risk-taking
behaviour, even where a UXO incident may have economic and social consequences for families and communities. Reinforcing factors
include food-security problems, which motivate people to engage in
the collection of scrap metal, lack of alternative income-generating
activities, price of scrap metal and lack of access to alternative farming land that is not contaminated with UXO.
A respondent stated, “I moved three bombies from the bottom of a
bomb crater. When I was digging I hit one of the bombies so I slowly

11.1 | winter 2006 | journal of mine action | notes from the field | 79

picked it up and moved it out from the bomb
crater to a nearby area. I was afraid when
moving the bombie but I needed the money.
In one bomb crater I could get 40 kilograms
(88 pounds) of scrap metal.” Currently,
scrap metal is approximately 1,700 kip per
kilo (approximately US$0.08/lb.11). Nearly
all UXO contamination is in rural Lao
where most people—about 80 percent of
the population—are subsistence rice farmers and have limited options for generating
a cash income if they stay within their communities and home base.
Almost all respondents who reported
voluntary exposure to potentially live ordnance were able to provide examples of the
risk-reduction strategies they took. These
indigenous risk-reduction strategies are
often at odds, however, with expert views
of safe handling of UXO. Indeed, some
respondents also recognised that their
strategies might still result in injury and
tried to learn more by watching village
experts or surreptitiously observing UXO
clearance teams to learn from the way
they handle UXO. Scrap-metal collectors,
including men, women and children using locally-procured metal detectors also
had a number of risk-reduction strategies
including the one described in the following statements:
• “I feel safer when digging, more confident that it isn’t a UXO when I hear
the small beeps.”
• “The system of the detector is that if
we find a small piece of scrap, we get
a different sound; if we find a large
piece of metal, we get a loud sound.”
While a number of respondents were
able to describe strategies they use for distinguishing between safe and unsafe ordnance, respondents identified accurate recognition skills as an area in which they felt
they needed more knowledge, according to
one scrap-metal dealer: “Without knowing
it, I have bought many things from villagers—BLUs12 with explosives, hand grenades
with no pins, bullets, mortar shells with
gunpowder inside.”
The survey also identified a number of
contradictions. For example, scrap-metal collection on the one hand is perceived as being
potentially risky but on the other hand is not
necessarily associated with accidents. This
may be due to a cognitive coping strategy
whereby the risk is explained away as being
exaggerated or a belief that the person has the
necessary skills to remain in control.
Conclusion
The assessment found UXO risk-takers,
including women and children, are gener-

ally aware of the risk and engage in some
form of risk-assessment process, which they
use to make rational and deliberate decisions regarding acceptable risk. However,
from other stakeholders’ perspectives such
as humanitarian mine-action experts, regulatory bodies, educators and decision makers, there are different views on acceptability and rationality of local risk-assessment
processes. This conflict is largely about a
divergent definition of risk, differences in
how problems are structured and solved,
differences in judgments about the probability of an accident, and different kinds
of knowledge.
While awareness is an important prerequisite to change and ongoing awareness
campaigns may be essential for children,
the assessment did not identify it as a major determinant of risk behaviour. Focussing
on traditional message-based approaches
to MRE is likely to result in developing an
intervention that does not address the major underlying determinants of behaviour.
Traditional messages on expert-perceived
positive behaviours common in MRE programmes may include “Don’t touch UXO”
and “If you see UXO, report it to a mine-action agency.” However, this approach could
result in MRE planners falling into the
common pitfall of developing an intervention that does not address the major determinants of high-risk behaviour.
To be effective, the MRE programme
will have to take into account the determinants of behaviour identified in the assessment. Such an approach may include
life skills and communication training. It
should also take into account the information and skill-development needs of at-risk
communities as identified by respondents in
this assessment. In this sense, it represents a
paradigm shift from current “expert” HMA
practice and message-based MRE. With
its emphasis on standards, safety, technical
expertise, and zero- or minimal risk, implementing such an approach, which actively
engages high-risk populations and builds
on current coping strategies and knowledge, is likely to be challenging. Such an
approach will require a change from zerorisk to risk minimisation and recognition
of the often valid risk-assessment processes
and risk-reduction strategies indigenous
communities employ. It may also involve
a more meaningful and useful transfer of
knowledge from experts to laypeople. As
M. Worden13 noted, speaking in the field
of health promotion, even when it is known
how to undertake successful prevention
activities and the people are aware of the
preventative tools, such interventions are
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often unpopular with policy makers, lobby
groups, the public and even practitioners
themselves. Recent examples of risk-minimisation approaches in HIV prevention
like safe needle exchange and safe injecting
practices may provide some insight into effective strategies in taking a pragmatic approach to UXO risk reduction.
As the assessment has shown, the complex milieu in which behavioural decisions
are made calls for a shift to a risk-minimisation approach. A range of integrated interventions that aim to address the underlying
vulnerabilities of UXO-affected communities is also needed. From this perspective,
UXO contamination in Lao PDR requires a
collaborative, multi-sectoral and multi-level
response that includes a range of legislative
and regulatory strategies, improved UXO
clearance methodology and targeting of resources, skills training, MRE and an integrated approach to UXO action that enables
the implementation of broader poverty-alleviation and sustainable-livelihood strategies. Such an approach will save lives, reduce
injuries and promote economic growth and
development, which in turn will contribute
to addressing underlying vulnerabilities and
reduce UXO risk.
See Endnotes, Page
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The Mine-action Process in Iraqi Kurdistan
The Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency has been working to clear Kurdistan of landmines and unexploded
ordnance that were placed by the former Iraqi government over the past 40 years and the Iranian Army
during the Iran-Iraq War from 1980–1988. The Agency is overcoming many challenges and has cleared
a vast number of minefields so the land can be handed back to the owners. Casualties from explosive
remnants of war are extremely high but a new mine-risk-education program will inform people who live
in dangerous areas how to minimize the threat of explosive remnants of war.
by Jamal Jalal Hussein [ Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency ]

T

he existence of landmines and unexploded
ordnance in any community has a direct impact on the local people, especially in regard
to their economic, social and physical well-being. The
previous Iraqi governments systematically contaminated
Kurdistan’s land with mines.
Since the initiation of the Kurdish freedom revolution and other Kurdish struggles, this practice was continuously applied to Kurdish lands and was prolonged
when the former Iraqi regime came to power in February
1963. An “Arabization” strategy was used in an attempt
to change the demographics of northern Iraq whereby
the Iraqi government displaced Kurdish families from
their land and replaced them with Arab families from
other areas of Iraq. In addition to dealing with this, during the consecutive conflicts that consumed all of Iraq
and Kurdistan, huge areas of Kurdish land were heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants
of war. This led to thousands of Kurdish citizens being
killed or facing lifelong handicaps.
Clearance Goals
The vision of the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action
Agency is to rid Kurdistan of ERW. Currently the mission is to reduce the impact of mines and unexploded
ordnance in the affected communities of Kurdistan.
This will be achieved through the demining process
(survey of contaminated communities, mapping, marking of hazardous areas, and destruction of mines and
UXO), mine-risk education and victim assistance. It is
a great challenge to clear mines from Kurdistan due to
the difficulty of the demining process, the large areas
that were contaminated and the approximate quantity of
emplanted mines numbering in the millions.
Achievements
There are 3,512 registered minefields in Kurdistan.
From the beginning of the demining process in
Kurdistan in early 1993 through late 2004, a total of
567 minefields and battle areas have been cleared and
returned to their owners.
Approximately 5,615,989 square meters (2.17 square
miles) of mined areas have been cleared, with 25,226

A mine-detection dog handler and a trained mine-detection dog are searching a marked hazardous
area for landmines.
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anti-personnel mines, 890 anti-tank mines and 273,404 pieces of UXO destroyed.
Throughout 2005 and 2006 a total of 100,083 people have directly benefited from
IKMAA’s clearance, explosive ordnance disposal and MRE efforts.
Factors Influencing Demining Difficulties
Experience shows many factors directly affect the clearance process and lead
to a slowdown in progress. The age of the minefields, as they are already 20–26
years old, leads to a number of complicating factors and difficulties in conducting demining operations. Some of these factors are related to Kurdistan’s natural
terrain and topography while other factors stem from the difficulty of mine clearance, the risks associated with mine clearance and difficulty of implementing the
International Mine Action Standards due to safety concerns. Specific factors that
affect mine clearance are:
• Limited period of time to work in some minefields due to weather
• Hard ground
• High, dry vegetation in most mined areas
• Lack of desire by deminers to work in mine clearance because of the threat
of dealing with suspected areas
• The existence of high numbers of metal fragments that slow progress because mine-clearance personnel must check each square meter of ground
with metal detectors. Most of Kurdistan’s large minefields were battle areas
during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988).
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